Abstract: In recent years, the field of the sociology of religion has largely ignored the topic of social stratification and religion, influenced by mid-twentieth-century scholars who minimized class differences.
religiosity may now be diverging from those found among their more educated and affluent peers.
According to GSS data, however, moderately educated whites make up 60 percent of the adult white population (aged 25-44) in the contemporary United States. In brief, the evidence we present here suggests that the middle is dropping out of the American religious sector, much as it has dropped out of the American labor market.
We then turn to a consideration of the economic, demographic, and cultural correlates of the religious disengagement of moderately educated whites. We do so from a broadly institutional perspective, recognizing both that religion is not only a social institution that supplies norms, beliefs, and rituals that pattern social behavior, or moral logics, but also an institution that depends on social and cultural structures from other institutions to sustain these moral logics (Friedland and Alford 1991) . In particular, we explore the possibility that working class disengagement from the institutions of work and marriage (Cherlin 2009; Wilcox 2010 ) are strongly associated with recent declines in religious attendance among white working class Americans. We view these two institutions as particularly important objects of inquiry because American religion has both legitimated and been bolstered by an "American Way of life" marked by stable employment and marriage over much of the last century (Edgell 2006; Herberg 1955 ). Thus, if moderately educated whites are now less likely to be stably employed, to earn a decent income, to be married with children, and to hold familistic views, they may also be less likely to feel comfortable or interested in regularly attending churches that continue to uphold conventional norms, either implicitly or explicitly (Edgell 2006; Wilcox 2004) . We also view the institutions of work and marriage as important sources of social and normative integration that link Americans to religious institutions (Schwadel, McCarthy, and Nelsen 2009) . For these reasons, this paper relies on the GSS and NSFG to explore the links between declines in working class religiosity and patterns of employment, income, family structure, sexual behavior, and attitudes toward premarital sex.
The religious disengagement of working class whites is important for at least three reasons. First, religious institutions typically supply their members with social and civic skills, and often a worldview that motivates them to engage the political or civic spheres, that increase their civic and political participation (Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995; Wuthnow 1995) . Second, religious institutions appear to foster higher levels of physical and psychological health among their members, both by providing social support and by furnishing people with a sense of meaning (Ellison 1991; Ellison and Levin 1998) . Third, and most important for our perspective, some research suggests that least-and moderately-educated Americans are especially likely to benefit from the social support and civic skills associated with religious institutions. The non-college-educated often lack the degree of access to social networks and civic skills that the college-educated have; and religious activity can compensate for this deficit. For instance, after reporting that more educated Americans enjoy more resources, including civic skills such as leading a meeting and income that they can use to make a donation, that provide them with a relative advantage when it comes to civic engagement and political participation, Verba et al. (1995: 18) find that "only religious affiliations… provide a counterbalance to this cumulative resource process." This, then, is why our paper examines recent trends in religious attendance, and their social and cultural causes, among white working class Americans.
Literature Review
In this paper we first examine how and why these economic changes may have led to increasing disengagement from institutional religion among the moderately educated working class. Our attention to religion is particularly important and timely because a longstanding tradition of research on religion and stratification (e.g., Demerath 1965; Lenski 1961; Niebuhr 1929 ) has largely fallen dormant since the 1970s. This older tradition found that working class Americans tended to be less religious in the early part of the twentieth century, at least when it came to church attendance, than their middle class peers. But by the 1970s social scientists had largely come to believe that the impact of social class on religion in the U.S. was no longer of much consequence (e.g., Hoge and Carroll 1978; Mueller and Johnson 1975) , in large part because the fortunes of American religion rose for both the working and middle/upper classes in the post World War II era to the point where there were not marked class differences between these two groups.
But, given growing income inequality, labor force instability, and the deteriorating economic position of non-college-educated men and their families, we believe that there are good reasons to expect that American religion is once again becoming heavily stratified. Indeed, recent research suggests an emerging class divide when it comes to civic engagement more generally (Wuthnow 2004) .
Why might religious participation have declined more among moderately educated Americans than among their college-educated peers? We argue that the transformation of the economy and the resulting decline in marriage have played a central role in eroding the structural and cultural connections between religious institutions and moderately-educated men and women. We further hypothesize that these social changes have been more important when it comes to religious attendance among nonHispanic whites than among African Americans and Hispanics. Our basic argument is that shifts in economic opportunities and in family formation over the last four decades have made many of the moral logics associated with American religious institutions both less realizable and less desirable among moderately educated whites. Lamont (2000) has argued persuasively that steadily employed white "working class" men, nearly all of whom are moderately educated, construct a moral world centered on what she calls "the disciplined self." It is based on the value of working hard every day, often with one's hands, and of being a steady provider to one's wife and children. This work ethic and sense of responsibility becomes a central part of a worker's self-worth, she writes, and workers use it to differentiate themselves from middle-class professionals, who are seen as lacking personal integrity and sincerity. Steadily employed black workers, Lamont writes, also construct a moral sense of self, but it centers not on discipline but rather on sharing with others in need-what she calls "the caring self."
The white working class ideal of the disciplined self has become less attainable in today's postindustrial economy. Over the last forty years, the U.S. has witnessed a precipitous decline of job opportunities in manufacturing for working-class individuals due to globalization and automation (Fischer and Hout 2006) . The result is a sharp decline in economic opportunity for young adults who would have followed their parents' footsteps into working-class occupations: The wages of men without college degrees have fallen since they peaked in the early 1970s, unemployment and underemployment have risen markedly among moderately educated men since the 1970s, and the wages of women without college degrees have failed to grow (Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz 2009; Wilcox 2010) . In fact, high-school educated young men today may be the first generation in memory to earn less than their fathers did (Levy 1998 ).
These economic developments have made it less possible for working class Americans to live up to their own ideals for economic success and to model the bourgeois lifestyle-steady work, decent income, and upward mobility-that has long been associated with mainstream religion in America (Herberg 1955) . Thus, moderately educated Americans may feel less attracted to churches that uphold the bourgeois virtues-delayed gratification, a focus on education, self-control, etc.-that undergird this lifestyle. As importantly, working class whites may also feel uncomfortable socializing with the middle and upper class whites who have increasingly come to dominate the life of religious congregations in the U.S. since the 1970s (Schwadel, McCarthy, and Nelsen 2009) , especially as they see their own economic fortunes fall. In brief, the declining economic position of white working class Americans may have made the bourgeois moral logic embodied in many churches both less attractive and attainable.
Not only have white churches in the United States functioned as bulwarks of bourgeois respectability, they have also promoted a family-centered moral logic that valorizes marriage and parenthood for much of the last century (Christiano 2000; Edgell 2006 ). When moderately educated white men and women can attain strong and stable marriages, they can find reinforcement for the lives they lead from their churches. In other words, white married couples attend church with their children partly as a way of displaying to their fellow congregants, who are often their neighbors and friends, their sense of responsibility and their commitment to familism-and also to gain reinforcement for their moral view of the world.
But since the 1970s, stable marriage has become harder to attain for moderately educated Americans (Cherlin 2009; Wilcox 2010) . They are now markedly less likely to get and stay married as adults, compared to college-educated adults. This is partly for economic reasons, with increasing spells of unemployment and underemployment, along with declining real wages, making working class men less attractive marriage partners.
But, in all likelihood, the retreat from marriage among moderately educated Americans is also rooted in cultural changes that have gone hand in hand with the economic changes affecting this sector of American life. Since the 1970s, working class Americans have become less likely to hold familistic beliefs, even as college-educated Americans have become more likely to subscribe to these very same beliefs (Martin and Parashar 2006; Wilcox 2010) . For instance, opposition to divorce and premarital sex has risen since the 1970s among the college-educated, while it has fallen among Americans who do not hold college degrees. The fact that less-educated Americans are now less likely to embrace a marriageminded mindset, in turn, has been linked to the declines in the percentage of moderately educated Americans who are in their first marriage (Wilcox 2010) .
The demographic and cultural shifts that have taken place among moderately educated Americans are important because a disproportionately high percentage of active adherents in American churches are married with children (Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995) . Moreover, churches tend to be cultural bulwarks of familism, with markedly higher levels of adherence to norms against divorce and premarital sex found among regular churchgoers compared to the population at large (Wilcox 2004 ). Thus, insofar as working class whites are less likely to abide by a familistic moral logic-both in practice and belief-they may be less attracted to religious congregations that tend to valorize conventional family life.
In sum, then, changes in the institutions of the labor market and the family appear to have undercut many of the socioeconomic and cultural resources that had until recently enabled many working class adults to identify with the moral logics of bourgeois respectability and familism that have long been upheld by mainstream religious institutions in the United States (Edgell 2006; Herberg 1955) .
Black churches, however, emphasize marriage less than white churches, relative to qualities such as shared struggle and perseverance (Cherlin 2009; Ellison and Sherkat 1995; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990) .
For instance, when it comes to family life, they speak of parent and child, of broader networks of kin, and of the fictive kinship to be found among one's brothers and sisters in church. It is possible, then, that African Americans could achieve the caring sense of self, even in an unfavorable economy and without benefit of marriage, and find support at church. This suggests that declines in church attendance among the moderately educated should be less for blacks than for whites.
Assessing trends over the past few decades in attendance among Hispanics is difficult because of changes in the composition of the Hispanic population. Given that issues related to immigration, discrimination, and incorporation into American society loom large for churches serving Hispanics (Figueroa Deck, 1989) , we suspect that Hispanic churches are less focused on family structure and employment, and more focused on providing a sense of solidarity and practical support to their members, than are non-Hispanic white churches. Moreover, there is less class heterogeneity among Hispanics, who tend not to be college-educated or affluent; this probably affords working class Hispanics a sense of comfort in the churches they attend (Schwadel, McCarthy, and Nelsen 2009) . Thus, we would expect that employment difficulties and lower incomes would be less likely to influence the church attendance of Hispanics than non-Hispanic whites. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:
H1: Religious service attendance will have declined more precipitously among moderately educated Americans than among college-educated Americans since the 1970s.
H1a: This decline will be evident for Whites, but not for Blacks or Hispanics.
H2: This decline will be associated, at least in part, with the disparate economic fortunes of the moderately-and college-educated during this time, namely their employment status, income level, and job stability.
H3: This decline will be associated, at least in part, with the disparate family structures (including family structure of origin, since parental religiosity is highly predictive of offspring religiosity) of the moderately-and college-educated during this time, namely their marital and parenthood statuses.
H4: This decline will be associated, at least in part, with changing attitudes toward premarital sex, as moderately-educated views have moved in a more liberal direction and college-educated views have moved in a more conservative direction since the 1970s on this issue.
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Data and Methods
We use data from the General Social Survey (GSS), a study of American adults conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, and the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics. The GSS is an ongoing nationally-representative survey that has been conducted on an annual or biannual basis since 1972. We pool the data from all of the surveys from 1972 to 2010. We limit our sample to 25-44 year-old respondents in order to focus on the stages of the life course most closely associated with career development and family formation, and to remain consistent with the NSFG data, which-due to their focus on fertility-only include respondents up to age 44. We impose the lower age limit of 25 so that most individuals will have finished their educations. Our sample size for our baseline model is 16,620.
For models including the mediating variables, the sample is 5,805 due to missing data.
The National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) is a series of national surveys of women of childbearing age, 15 to 44. In this paper, we pool data from the 1982 the , 1988 the , 2002 the -2008 the surveys. (Two earlier waves, 1973 the and 1976 , only included married women. The NSFG added interviews with men to the waves conducted in the 2000s, but it has no information on men prior to that.) The main purpose of the NSFG is to obtain detailed information about fertility, such as children ever born and family planning methods used; but it also obtained marriage and cohabitation histories. It is also one of the few government surveys that asks about religious attendance and beliefs. The baseline sample size is 10,851; missing values were imputed by the NSFG staff.
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable in the GSS is a nine-category measure tapping respondents' frequency of attendance at religious services. The GSS asked, "How often do you attend religious services?" Response categories ranging from never to more than once per week were provided.
We code this variable on a scale from 0 (never) to 8 (more than once a week). The NSFG also asked about religious attendance, but the response categories varied from survey to survey. For the comparative analyses of this paper, we were able to construct a four-category dependent variable: never (coded as 1), less than once per month (2), once per month but less than once per week (3), and once per week or more often (4).
Key independent variables. Our key independent variables are educational attainment, survey year or decade, and multiplicative interaction terms between survey year or decade and educational attainment. In both datasets, educational attainment is dummy coded as less than high school degree, high school degree or some college, and the reference category of four-year college degree or more-. In the married with children, married without children, unmarried with children, and the reference category of unmarried without children. For the GSS, a dummy variable for whether the respondents' parents were divorced or separated at age 16. For the NSFG, a dummy variable for whether the respondent lived with both biological or adoptive parents from birth to age 18. Cultural factors. For the GSS, we include a dummy variable for whether respondents oppose premarital sex. The NSFG has no relevant attitudinal variables, but we have included age at first intercourse, given that premarital sex has been linked to declines in religious attendance (Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007) .
Control variables.
We include GSS controls for region of residence, age, age squared, and gender. For the NSFG, we include age and age squared (all respondents are women, and region of residence is not available).
We first present graphs displaying trends in attendance by education, race, and Hispanic ethnicity for Americans age 25-44. We then present a series of ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression models predicting religious service attendance among White Americans ages 25-44. Our first model (Model 1) uses all available cases to establish a significant interaction between educational attainment and survey year (for the GSS) or survey decade (for the NSFG). We present a second model (Model 2a) for the GSS that parallels the first but is restricted to the cases for which there is nonmissing information for all the mediating variables. We do not present Model 2a for the NSFG because missing values were imputed by the NSFG staff. We then enter the mediating variables in blocks: Model 2b enters the economic variables, Model 2c enters the family structure variables (and removes the economic variables), Model 2d enters the cultural variables (and removes the economic and family structure variables) and Model 2e enters all of the independent and mediating variables. This approach allows us to examine the mediating effect of economic, family structure, and cultural factors separately, as well as together.
Results
Figure 1 displays trends in the percentage of women aged 25-44 who attended religious services once per month or more often, based on the GSS and NSFG data, by race and Hispanic ethnicity, from the 1980s to the 2000s. Let us begin with Panel A for non-Hispanic Whites. Looking first at the two lefthand sets of bars for the 1980s, we can see that in both data sets the moderately educated (the middle category) were nearly as likely to attend monthly or more as were the college-educated. Both datasets also show that the least educated had markedly less religious attendance than did either of the two moreeducated groups. Turning to the two right-hand bars for the 2000s, we can see that the level of attendance of the college-educated had diverged from the level among the moderately educated. In the GSS, all three educational groups showed a decline, but the decline (8 percentage points) was greatest among the moderately educated. In the NSFG, attendance among the college-educated had increased slightly, while decreasing among the moderately educated and the least educated (4 percentage points for both groups).
Overall, both datasets show a pattern in the 1980s of comparable attendance among the moderately educated and the college educated, whereas the pattern in the 2000s is of sharper differences between the higher attendance of the college-educated and lower attendance among both the moderately educated and least educated. The least educated have experienced faster rates of decline than even the moderately educated, and they began at an even "lower" starting point (b = -.990; p < .001), meaning the gap between the least educated and most educated is even larger than the one between the moderately educated and most educated.
Models 2a-e of Table 1 attempt to shed light on the mechanisms driving these differential rates of change. Because our potential mediating variables introduce large amounts of missing data, we present another model similar to Model 1 but with the reduced sample (Model 2a). Then we consider the mediating effects of economic factors (Model 2b), family structure factors (Model 2c), cultural factors (Model 2d), and all three types of factors (Model 2e). Model 2a reveals a similar story as Model 1, though the interaction effect for year times least educated is no longer statistically significant and is smaller in size than the interaction for year times moderate education. The interaction effect for the moderately educated is slightly smaller than in Model 1 and significant at p < .05. Model 2b suggests the changing economic fortunes of the moderately and most educated Americans are associated with the gap in religious service attendance. In particular, those with higher incomes are more likely to attend religious services more frequently, and those who have experienced unemployment at some point over the last 10 years are less likely to attend (Schwadel, McCarthy, and Nelsen 2009) . Moreover, those who "keep house" are much more likely to attend religious services, a group that has declined more rapidly among the moderately educated than among the most educated. These economic factors reduce the yearmoderate education interaction effect by about 25 percent, and its statistical significance is only marginal.
Model 2c looks at how changes in family structure are associated with this growing divide in religious service attendance. Growing up with divorced parents has a strong negative association with religious service attendance as an adult, and being married-especially being married with children-has a positive effect. These variables reduce the difference in the rate of decline between the moderately and most educated by about 38 percent and make it no longer significant statistically. Model 2d looks at associations with changing attitudes-measured here by attitudes toward premarital sex. Those who say premarital sex is wrong in more circumstances are much more likely to go to religious services more often than are those who are more accepting of premarital sex. Accounting for these different attitudes reduces the year-moderately educated interaction effect by about 31 percent, and makes it statistically significant only at p < .10. In the final model (Model 2e), the year-moderately educated interaction is reduced by 50 percent and is no longer significant. Certainly there are endogeneity issues with some of these mediators, and we caution against any strong causal conclusions from these data, but it does appear that differences in economics, family structure, and culture account for some of the difference in declining religious service attendance between moderately educated Americans and their college educated counterparts. Table 2 reports coefficients from OLS regression models predicting religious service attendance in the pooled 1980s and pooled 2000s National Surveys of Family Growth. The results are, in general, similar to the GSS. The coefficients in Model 1 suggest that religious attendance has dropped more for the moderately educated than for the college educated, although the significance levels are not as strong as in the GSS: The key interaction between moderate education and decade is negative, as predicted, and significant at the p < .10 level; the interaction between low education and decade is negative but not significant. Models 2b and 2c show significant associations with religious attendance that reduce the magnitudes and significance of the key interaction terms for education and decade. There is a curvilinear relationship between increases in income (relative to the poverty line) and religious service attendance, with attendance highest among those at 200-299% of the poverty line. Being married with children is also, as in the GSS, associated with more frequent religious service attendance. Age at first intercourse, which was obtained in the NSFG but not the GSS, shows a significant association between an older age at first intercourse and more frequent religious attendance. But age at first intercourse does not appear to impact the association between the key interaction terms for education and decade. Moreover, we must caution here against strong causal inferences because it is just as plausible that frequent religious attendance is the cause of an older age at first intercourse rather than the effect. Except for employment, all of the mediating variables retain their statistical significance in the final Model 2e.
Discussion
This paper finds evidence that religious life among the moderately educated -which may be the closest analogy to the "working class" today -is becoming increasingly deinstitutionalized, much as working class economic and family life have become increasingly deinstitutionalized. Using repeated cross-sectional surveys from two national data collections programs, the GSS and the NSFG, we find that religious attendance among whites has declined most precipitously among whites without college degrees, including moderately educated whites-that is, whites with a high school degree or some college but no bachelor's degree. By contrast, we do not find a decline among moderately educated blacks; and we do not find a monotonic educational gradient at all among Hispanics.
Our results suggest that the bourgeois and familistic moral logics that have long been linked to religious institutions are now less powerful in the lives of working class whites than they used to be.
Specifically, in the last forty years, white working class income, employment, marital stability, and cultural conservatism have all declined-and markedly more so than they have for college-educated whites (Cherlin 2009; Wilcox 2010) . Indeed, our results suggest that these bourgeois and familistic factors may account for a substantial share of the relatively large decline of working class church attendance. Within the limits of observational data, we think that our results suggest that the erosion of the labor market and cultural structures associated with the bourgeois and familistic moral logics in American life may have played an important role in accounting for recent declines in religious attendance among working class whites.
While we recognize that not everyone wishes to worship, and that religious diversity can be valuable, we also think that the existence of a large group in the middle of the American stratification system that is increasingly disconnected from religious institutions is troubling for our society. This development is especially troubling because it only reinforces the social marginalization of working class whites who are also increasingly disconnected from the institutions of marriage and work (Cherlin 2011) .
Moreover, our results suggest that it is important for the sociology of religion to once again attend to social stratification in religious life. The broadly shared prosperity of the mid-twentieth century may have diminished class differences in religious experience in the middle of the twentieth century to the point that they were unimportant. That at least would seem to be the conclusion drawn by leading scholars during the latter half of the twentieth century. But two great forces of change have widened the differences since the 1970s: the bifurcation of the labor market due to globalization and automation and the great cultural changes in family life that have made non-marriage-based family patterns acceptable.
Studies of religion in twenty-first century America will need to take these class-based differences into account.
Note
1 It may also be that this trend merely reflects the rise of religious nones (Hout and Fischer 2002) .
Controlling for growing up with no religion, however, did not affect our results significantly. Reference groups are most educated, working fulltime, unmarried with no children, and lives in New England. Reference groups are most educated, 500% or more poverty line, and married with children.
